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• Recovery in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain is held back in part by structural
barriers. Overcoming these requires structural reform and public investment.
Given the limited availability of political and financial capital, prioritising reform
efforts and spending is important, but difficult. The different success factors
for individual sectors are complementary. Using the example of the high-tech
industry, we make the case that only investing in one success factor (eg broad-
band infrastructure) without having a sufficient endowment of others (eg edu-
cation) is unlikely to make the sector successful.
• One consequence of the complementarity of the different success factors is
that public investment and reform efforts should be fine-tuned in order to match
the endowment of other factors. This might imply an increase in efforts to tackle
several structural barriers at the same time, but it might also imply reducing
investment in less promising fields. This in turn requires strategic thinking about
whether it is worthwhile pursuing development strategies that require invest-
ment in many success factors but that do not promise much success. Such a
strategic approach to public investment and reform efforts might make the allo-
cation of scarce public financial and political capital more efficient.
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1. See Darvas and Pisani-
Ferry (2011).
2. This includes legislation,
formal institutions and
actual governance. A dis-
cussion of the institutional
deficits can be found in
Pisani- Ferry, Jean (2010)
‘Euro-area governance:
what went wrong? How to
repair it?’ Policy Contribu-
tion 2010/05, Bruegel.
3. See for example Barro
and Sala-i-Marin (1995).
4. For example, according to
Darvas (2012b) ‘Composi-
tional effects on productiv-
ity, labour cost and export
adjustment’, Policy Contri-
bution 2012/11, Bruegel,
the unit labour cost in
Greece, Italy and Spain
increased by more than 30
percent between 2000Q1
and 2008Q1.
TOGETHER WITH OTHER EUROPEAN UNION
COUNTRIES, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain saw
negative average annual growth rates in 2008-11
(see Map 1). In contrast to most EU economies,
however, they expect no or even negative growth
to continue in 2013 (Figure 1). Restoring growth
is essential for these countries to achieve the
sustainable budgets that are necessary to
maintain the integrity of the euro area in a manner
that is both socially bearable and politically
supportable1. Their economic decline is
intrinsically tied to the European sovereign bond
and banking crisis, which has affected various
drivers of growth, by for example reducing
aggregate demand. However, the crisis is itself
partly caused by structural barriers to growth.
Overcoming the crisis and restoring growth
requires two strands of action: reforms targeted at
the macro-economic and institutional dimension
of the European sovereign bond and banking
crisis2, and the resolution of structural barriers to
economic development. In this Policy Contribution
we focus on the structural reform aspect.
Countries’ long-term growth prospects are
fundamentally determined by structural factors
such as infrastructure, human capital, financial
sector development and the quality of regulation3.
Table 1 on page 3 shows that the southern EU
countries and those that joined the bloc in 2004
and afterwards continue to lag behind in several
of these factors. The southern countries
experienced pre-crisis growth for a number of
reasons (eg convergence, cheap capital fuelling
internal demand); however, their competitiveness
substantially deteriorated4 not least because the
long-term structural determinants of their growth
did not improve. In addition, structural barriers
prevented quick adjustments in those countries
to the changing economic environment during the
crisis. This has proved particularly detrimental for
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Map 1: Annual average GDP growth rate 2008-11
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 1: Expected growth rates for 2013 (%)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2012.
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euro-area countries that were unable to devalue to
improve their competitive positions5.
The different structural factors behind sectoral
success are inter-related, and this should be taken
into account when addressing structural weak-
nesses. Figure 2 illustrates that in some cases,
where there are complementary relationships
between success factors, shifting efforts between
different policies might simultaneously reduce
costs and increase benefits. This holds not only
for public investment, but also for reforms that
complement public investment, such as cutting
red tape for innovative young companies.
General structural factors such as education,
infrastructure and regulation encompass a wide
range of sub-divisions. Infrastructure, for example,
entails access to water, electricity, material and
immaterial communication. Each of these sub-
divisions features different dimensions that policy
makers might influence, for example the speed,
price and reliability of data connections. Individual
sectors require different sets of structural
strengths to be successful. Consequently,
unleashing sectoral growth potentials requires
addressing structural factors relevant for the
individual sector. Thereby, the individual structural
strengths are complimentary. To illustrate this
point we will in the following focus on the high-
tech sector. The motivation for this choice is that
this sector is a typical target for sectoral
development policies because, as Eurostat puts
it, “high-tech sectors and enterprises are key
drivers of economic growth, productivity and
social protection, and generally a source of high
value-added and well-paid employment”.
In this Policy Contribution we will describe the
complementary relationship between different
types of reforms and public investment for
success in the high-tech sector. Subsequently, we
discuss the implications of this complementarity
for the mix of public investments and reform
policies in times of scarce fiscal resources and
limited political capital.
COMPLEMENTARITY OF REFORMS AND PUBLIC
INVESTMENT 
Success in high-tech industries builds on various
factors including specialised education, the
presence of communication infrastructure, and
good regulation. Map 2 indicates that the
peripheral countries of the south and east are less
equipped in terms of an educated workforce (ie
PISA scores6). Maps 3 and 4 illustrate weaknesses
in modern communication infrastructure and
network regulation (ie broadband connections in
households,) relative to other countries in the EU.
Map 5 demonstrates that these countries also
spend relatively little on R&D. These indicators
correspond to these countries' below average
employment in high-tech sectors and below
average high-tech exports, as shown by Maps 6
and 7.
Table 2 on page 6 highlights the structurally
different developments in northern and southern
Europe by comparing the performances of Italy,
Greece, Spain and Portugal to those of Finland and
Sweden. The four southern countries have high
education drop-out rates. In most of their regions
more than 15 percent of students leave education
or formal training early. In some Spanish and
Portuguese regions, this figure is greater than 20
percent. In contrast, fewer than 5 percent of
Finnish and Swedish students are considered
early leavers. In terms of the scholastic
performance of 15-year-olds as measured by PISA
(see footnote 6), results are more balanced. While
Finland (>525) and Greece (<475) are the
positive and negative outliers, Italy, Spain,
Sweden and Portugal are close to the European
average (scores between 475 and 500). 
5. Note that for example the
Czech Koruna, the Hungar-
ian Forint and the Polish
Zloty significantly depreci-
ated compared to the euro
compared to their peak in
summer 2008.
6. The Programme for
International Student
Assessment (PISA) is a
worldwide study by the
Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and
Development (OECD) in
member and non-member
nations, of 15-year-old
school pupils' mathematics,
science and reading
attainment.
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Figure 2: Complementarity of public policies for
potential growth of the high-tech sector
Source: Bruegel.
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broadband connections. The contrast is even
starker when comparing country scores given by
the World Economic Forum’s political and
regulatory environment index (for network
regulation)7. Greece's score is in the lowest
category; Portugal ranks slightly better, but still
performs poorly compared to other nations,
7. World Economic Forum
(2012).
Similarly, in terms of modern communication
network infrastructure measured by broadband
connections in households as a percentage of
total households, Portugal and Greece are
negative outliers, with less than 45 percent
connectivity, while more than 75 percent of
Finnish and Swedish households have access to
525-600
510-525
490-510
450-490
0-450
Map 2: PISA average scale including reading,
mathematics and science, 2009
Source: Eurostat.
85-95
75-85
65-75
45-65
0-45
Map 3: Broadband connections in households as %
of households, 2011
Source: Eurostat.
5.5-6
5-5.5
4.5-5
4-4.5
0-4
Map 4: Political and regulatory environment (net-
work regulation), scale of 1-7 (7=best), 2012
Source: Network Readiness Index 2012 of the World
Economic Forum.
2.5 - 5
2 - 2.5
1.5 - 2
1 - 1.5
0 - 1
Map 5: Total R&D intramural expenditure as % of
GDP, 2010
Source: Eurostat.
5 - 12
4 - 5
3 - 4
2 - 3
0 - 2
Map 6: High-tech Employment as % of total
employment, 2011
Source: Eurostat.
24 - 31
16 - 24
8 - 16
5 - 8
1 - 5
Map 7: High-tech exports as % of total exports,
2009
Source: Eurostat.
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whereas Spain achieves the EU median. Again,
Finland and Sweden achieve the highest ranks in
the index.
In line with the low network connectivity indicator,
Greece has the largest percentage of population
who have never used a computer. By contrast,
fewer than 20 percent of the Finnish and Swedish
populations have never used a computer. We find
a corresponding distribution when comparing total
R&D intramural expenditure. This figure is
between 3 percent and 4 percent for Finland and
Sweden. It is less than 0.5 percent for Greece, and
between 0.5 percent and 2 percent for various
regions of Spain and Portugal.
The disparities described above are reflected in
the final statistics which consider high-tech
employment as a percentage of total employment
and high-tech exports as a percentage of total
exports. High-tech industries account for less than
2 percent of total employment in Greece, between
2 and 4 percent for parts of Spain, Portugal and
Italy, and more than 7 percent in Finland. Sweden
is not a top performer in this instance, but
nonetheless scores above the EU median.
The contrast is less pronounced when consider-
ing high-tech exports. Here, both Finland and
Sweden are closer to the EU median.
This comparison indicates that Italy, Greece, Spain
and Portugal on one hand and Finland and Sweden
on the other are experiencing contrasting
developments. At least four hypotheses attempt
to explain the origin of such divergent patterns: (1)
the countries are at different stages of economic
development, (2) the pattern is the natural result
of specialisation, (3) the differences are due to
locational or cultural factors, (4) the countries are
locked into different varieties of capitalism (Hall
and Soskice, 2001).
It is impossible to determine which effect is the
main cause of the divergent patterns, though evi-
dence suggests that the southern economic
model has failed to generate the foundations for
sustainable growth. Thus the question is whether
some of the north European success factors can
be transposed to the south European countries in
order to reproduce north European success. In the
following, we argue that reproducing success is
difficult because it hinges not only on the average
level of structural factors but also on their interac-
tion. In particular, sectoral success cannot be
quickly engineered by just improving some easy-
to-fix structural factors.
The interaction of different factors is confirmed at
the country level by the correlation exercise
shown in Table 3 (page 7). Even after controlling
for different levels of GDP per capita, countries
with better education, broadband access, network
regulation, higher penetration of computers or
higher R&D intensity, have a higher share of high-
tech employment and exports. Causality is unde-
termined, yet sectoral strength appears to be
conditional on the interaction of these factors.
When looking at specialisation in high-tech
industries (as measured by high-tech exports) we
find that several factors are complementary. As
Structural factors Specialisation
Early leavers
from school
and training,
as % of
corresponding
population
PISA average
scale
Broadband
connections
in households
as % of
households
Political and
regulatory
environment
Individuals
who have
never used a
computer as %
of population
Total R&D
intramural
expenditure
as % of GDP
High-tech
employment
as % of total
employment
High-tech
exports as %
of total
exports
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Finland
Sweden
Table 2: Indicators linked to success in high-tech industries
Source: Bruegel based on: Eurostat, World Economic Forum, OECD. Note: time period: 2008 - 2012. Colours indicate performance
in comparison to other European countries: dark green (top performer) – light green – yellow – orange – red (bottom performer).
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the regression results below demonstrate, scoring
in the lowest 30 percent in terms of PISA score,
broadband connections and R&D expenditures
has some power to explain low levels of export
specialisation. That is, a high score in any one or
two of the factors can be entirely offset by being
among the under-performers when it comes to the
third factor.
Hence, resolving infrastructure, education or reg-
ulatory issues individually might have limited
impact on the growth potential of high-tech indus-
tries. For example, the net benefit of additional
infrastructure spending might be negative if regu-
latory issues prevent infrastructure prices from
dropping. Other sectors illustrate further these
complementarities: opening markets without cre-
ating a framework that accommodates domestic
investment might risk shifting activity to more pro-
ductive offshore locations. To give a specific exam-
ple, improving access to the Greek electricity
market, while at the same time maintaining the
inefficient de-facto state monopoly, might result
in higher electricity imports.
Furthermore, the potential (feedback-) effect of
sectoral success on the factors that underlie the
sector's success is likely to reinforce
specialisation patterns. If a successful sector
promises better job prospects and higher wages,
it attracts more students into corresponding
education. Similarly, governments will more
willingly invest in sector-specific education,
infrastructure, regulatory reform or research if a
successful sector can translate these efforts into
instantaneous economic growth and jobs.
This leads to the timing issue. Most public
investment and reform has a substantial upfront
cost that only pays off in the long term.
Sometimes the public has to invest for a long time
in specific factors before a level is reached that
allows a new sector to flourish – education
systems being a classic example.
As a consequence of the above-described effects,
a large number of reforms and public investments
in structural factors might appear to offer little
benefit for a policymaker faced with the urgent
requirements of the economic and fiscal crisis.
DISCUSSION
The example of the high-tech sector demonstrates
that sectoral success and the presence of
corresponding structural factors coincide. It is, in
fact, sensible to assume that structural factors
form the basis for sectoral success. In the
following we will discuss what it would take for
governments to engineer sectoral success. We
start by discussing the implications of the
complementarity of different public investments.
High-tech
exports
High-tech
employment
Network
Readiness 
R&D 
expenditure
PISA score Broadband
Non-usage
of computer
High-tech employment 0.23*
Network readiness 0.53***
R&D expenditure 0.24** 0.50*** 0.50***
Pisa score 0.23** 0.19* 0.58* 0.27*
Broadband connectivity 0.58*** 0.17* 0.88*** 0.44*** 0.73***
Non-usage of computer -0.58*** -0.38*** -0.84* -0.49*** -0.67* -0.91***
Early leavers from education -0.317*** -0.29*** -0.22** -0.21** -0.36*** 0.39*
Table 3: Are there significant correlations between structural factors?
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, Network Readiness Index. The factors are made orthogonal to the level of economic devel-
opment by using the residuals of a regression on per capita GDP. The variables are the same as used in maps 2-7. Green indi-
cates a significant (* 10%, ** 5%, ***1%) positive correlation, red a significant negative correlation, all others are not significant
at the 5% level.
Share of high-tech
exports as % of total
exports
Constant -2.21***
Broadband access 0.321***
Pisa score -0.117***
Intramural R&D as % of GDP -1.16**
Being among the last 30% in one
of the categories
-5.42***
Table 4: The importance of complementarity
Source: Bruegel. Note: We control the variables for per capita
GDP, *** at the 1 % confidence level, ** at the 5% confidence
level, N=93, R²=47%.
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Then we address the interaction between reforms
and public investment. Finally, we discuss the
thorny issue of targeting sectors.
Dealing with complementarities
To engineer sectoral success, public investment
is obviously best employed when it is targeted to
individual shortcomings that are holding back the
entire sector. As discussed, the factors
underpinning the success of a specific sector are
often complementary. Hence, addressing
individual shortcomings might not be beneficial if
other barriers persist. In the high-tech example, it
might for example not be enough to improve the
broadband communication infrastructure. Without
investment in the quality and length of education,
in addition to targeted support to R&D, the cost of
a massive broadband infrastructure deployment
might surpass its economic benefits.
Consequently, a holistic view needs to be taken of
public investment8. At the same time, the concept
of complementarity suggests that public funds
used for investment in programmes that cannot
become beneficial because of a lack of
complementary factors might be employed more
beneficially elsewhere.
Interaction of reforms and public investments
Deep structural reforms are necessary to restore
the foundations for growth in Greece, as well as in
Spain, Portugal, and Italy (see Table 1). But, the
most important structural reforms are charac-
terised by upfront costs that only pay dividends
in the medium to long term (eg education system,
pension system, labour market). Implementing
such reforms without a commitment to conduct
the necessary upfront public investment signifi-
cantly challenges their prospects of success. In
addition, some essential structural reforms might
only become politically feasible if losers can be
compensated to some degree. Consequently, a
key criterion for public investment is if it supports
necessary structural reforms. This entails two con-
sequences. First, even the most cash-strapped
public administrations might consider prioritising
some funds for supporting reforms. This would not
only hold for regional or national budgets. The EU
might also focus its structural and regional funds
on supporting reform efforts.
Second, certain public investment cannot deliver
because the institutional framework is insufficient
and corresponding reforms might not be easily
implemented (ie if the first consequence is
unfeasible). Expenditures in corresponding
sectors – even though they are often highly
politically contagious such as spending on
declining incumbent industries  – should be
assiduously scrutinised.
Targeting sectors?
The costs and benefits of resolving such barriers
differ between sectors and regions. To follow-up
on the high-tech example, it might well be that
certain countries lack so many of the
underpinnings for a high-tech driven growth
model, that the financial and political capital
required to remove the shortcomings in the high-
tech sector would be better employed in another
area. This leaves policymakers with the tough
choice of which sectors (and sometimes also
regions) to support with the scarce available
funds. Implementing the simple economic rule
that the sectors should be supported where
additional funding has the highest benefit is
difficult to implement, as these benefits are
contingent on many factors: becoming
competitive in sectors with fierce international
competition is difficult (eg photovoltaic panels),
supporting sectors with limited growth potential
might be a dead-end (eg rotary printing presses),
supporting sectors that feature a concentrated
market structure and focus on the domestic
market risks translating into higher rents for
producers instead of higher competitiveness of
the sector (eg retail) and focusing on existing
sectors risks exposing the country even more to
sectoral shocks (eg the forestry industry in
Finland in the 1990s). The cost of engendering the
success of a specific sector is contingent on how
difficult it is for a country to develop competitive
strength in that sector. This again depends on the
presence of complementary factors and how
costly it is to address the identified shortcomings.
Hidalgo et al (2007) provide an interesting
approximation to the cost of making a sector
competitive. They use the correlation of export
competitiveness between different sectors as one
indicator to identify which sectors in a country
8. Thereby, it might prove
helpful that public invest-
ment can be very narrowly
targeted to different themes
(eg R&D, infrastructure or
education), regions and sec-
tors (eg high-tech, services,
industry). Consequently,
comprehensive packages
for regional and sectoral
development that built on
existing strength could be
engineered.
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might become competitive. They claim that
countries might become competitive in sectors
that are under-developed but ‘close’ to sectors
already present in the country under
consideration. To measure the ‘closeness’ of the
sectors, they analyse on a global scale the co-
location of sectors in countries. For example,
countries exporting semi-conductors are typically
found to be also exporting photovoltaic cells (see
Huberty and Zachmann, 2011). Hence, a country
that is successful in exporting semi-conductors,
but not yet in exporting photovoltaic cells, might
be more easily able to generate export
competitiveness in the latter than other countries.
For Greece, for example, Hausmann (2011)
identifies the main product markets, which are
agriculture (milk products, dried fruits, vegetables,
tobacco, wheat, cotton, olive oil); metals
(aluminium, copper, ferro-alloys, cutlery); textiles
and garments; construction materials (cements,
bars, pipes); and chemicals (medicines,
cosmetics, petrochemicals). Hausmann (2011)
suggests moving towards 'nearby' products that
fulfil four criteria: First, how easy would it be to
become 'good' at the product; second, what is the
potential gain from producing it; third, how
sophisticated is the product; and last, how
strategic is the product – namely, how will it
improve the firm’s (or country's) position?
This indicates that targeting sectors to overcome
barriers by implementing reforms and public
investments is a complex strategic exercise9. But
skipping the strategic choice step and returning to
a disbursement of public investment based on
historic sector strength and lobbying power is no
option. Without strategic direction it might make
sense to completely omit public ‘investment in
growth’ programmes. Finally, independent ex-post
evaluation of the choice is essential to learn for
the future and to decide on the continuation of
existing programmes. 
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